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SYMPOSIUM:   
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:  
REFLECTIONS ON CALABRESI AND YOO’S THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE 
FOREWORD 
Christopher S. Yoo* 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 6 and 7, 2009, more than three dozen of the nation’s 
most distinguished commentators on presidential power gathered in 
Philadelphia to explore themes raised by the book that Steven Cala-
bresi and I co-authored reviewing the history of presidential practices 
with respect to the unitary executive.1  We are honored and humbled 
that so many friends and colleagues, both those sympathetic to our 
argument and those who disagree with some or all of our analysis, 
joined here together to celebrate our book’s publication and to de-
bate its merits.  Publication of a book is always a major milestone in 
any scholar’s professional life, and this book is no exception.  The 
conference honoring our book and this special journal issue bringing 
together the articles presented there provide me with a welcome op-
portunity both to look backwards on the history of our project and to 
look forwards at the questions yet to be answered. 
I.  LOOKING BACKWARD 
We first presented the research that eventually became this book 
at the Symposium on “Presidential Power in the 21st Century” hosted 
by the Case Western Reserve University School of Law in April 1997.  
In addition to representing the public debut of this project, this sym-
posium also marked the beginning of a number of friendships that 
would prove enduring.  Our host was Michael Gerhardt, who was 
then Case Western’s Dean and who graciously agreed to participate 
in this conference.  The conference speakers included many of the 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). 
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people here today, including Michael Fitts, who unbeknownst to me 
at the time would eventually become my Dean and the host of this 
conference. 
It is hard to capture how controversial our research was when we 
first presented it at that conference in 1997.  At the time, the unitary 
executive was widely criticized as an invention of the Reagan Admini-
stration that was inconsistent with our nation’s practices and tradi-
tions.2  In addition, institutions like the independent counsels en-
joyed widespread political support, particularly since the Whitewater 
investigation had not yet shifted its focus from allegations of financial 
wrongdoing to the sordid details of the nature of President Bill Clin-
ton’s relationship with Monica Lewinsky.  Indeed, twelve years ago 
our prediction that the law would repudiate the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act (EIGA) in much the same manner as it repudiated the Te-
nure of Office Act seemed quite radical.3 
Looking back, I cannot help but be struck by how much percep-
tions have changed over the past dozen years.  The Whitewater inves-
tigation demonstrated that independent counsel investigations did 
not restrict their attention to any particular party and demonstrated 
the accuracy of Justice Scalia’s admonitions about the dangers of pro-
secutorial discretion unchecked by presidential oversight.4  Political 
support for the EIGA abruptly vanished, and the statute was allowed 
to sunset out of existence.  In addition, as Elena Kagan has docu-
mented, the shift from Republican to Democratic control of the 
White House during the Clinton years did not cause any decline in 
the president’s support for centralized control of the administration.5  
The early indications are that the Obama Administration is as com-
mitted to presidential control of the execution of the law as his pre-
 
 2 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1994) (arguing that by the late 1970s, the scope of presidential 
authority over the execution of the law before “President Reagan’s efforts to assert hier-
archical control over the bureaucracy” spurred “a minor revolution”); Morton Rosenberg, 
Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers:  The Rise and Demise of the 
Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 634 
(1989) (calling the unitary executive “a myth concocted by the Reagan administration to 
provide a semblance of legal respectability for an aggressive administrative strategy de-
signed to accomplish what its failed legislative agenda could not”).  For a modern re-
statement of this position, see Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Uni-
tary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313, 314, 318–23 (2010) (distinguishing a “strong 
theory” of the unitary executive emerging under the Reagan administration). 
 3 See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-
Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1462 (1997). 
 4 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–32 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 5 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
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decessors, if not more so.6  The consistency with which the last several 
administrations have embraced centralized control over the admini-
stration of federal law eloquently demonstrates how the unitary ex-
ecutive has gained general acceptance.7  It also reflects a recognition 
that debates over the unitary executive are not merely a matter of 
partisanship, as some have claimed, but rather raise fundamental is-
sues about the proper balance of power within the federal govern-
ment that transcend the politics of the moment. 
One major focus of our project is to debunk the notion that the 
unitary executive is a recent invention.8  As our book documents, the 
debate over the president’s authority over the execution of the law 
was one of the major issues debated by the First Congress9 and has 
lain at the heart of some of the biggest political controversies in U.S. 
history.  Perhaps the most critical moment in our nation’s history was 
the period following the Civil War, which pitted a White House that 
wanted a quick, conciliatory reunification of our nation against a 
Congress that wanted a more punitive Reconstruction.  A president 
who was elected by one party was succeeded by a vice president from 
the opposition party who had been added to the ticket to broaden its 
appeal.  Furthermore, Abraham Lincoln’s unique strength of leader-
ship played a critical role in holding the nation together when con-
fronted with perhaps its greatest crisis.  Sadly, his successor, Andrew 
Johnson, lacked Lincoln’s political skills.  The result was the first 
presidential impeachment in our nation’s history.  The grounds for 
the impeachment centered on the unitary executive, specifically the 
propriety of Johnson’s removal of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton 
despite the enactment of the Tenure of Office Act, which ostensibly 
denied him the power to do so.10 
Another salient example is Watergate, which represented perhaps 
the greatest challenge in our nation’s history to people’s faith in the 
government.  Most importantly for the purposes of our book, the 
Nixon Administration’s removal of Archibald Cox as special prosecu-
 
 6 See Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies:  A Debate over Law or Poli-
tics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 638–41 (2010). 
 7 See Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises:  Uncertainty, Information Over-
load, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 359 (2010) (noting how the uni-
tary executive “has attained mainstream constitutional status and won adherents across 
the political spectrum”). 
 8 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 3 (calling the controversy over the unitary executive 
“The Oldest Debate in Constitutional Law”); see also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 5 
(calling the controversy over the unitary executive “[a]n Old (But Quite Lively) Debate”). 
 9 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
 10 Id. at 179–87. 
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tor set the stage for a twenty-one year experiment with independent 
counsels appointed under the EIGA.  The widespread use of inde-
pendent counsels plagued every administration that followed and led 
to the near impeachment of one president (Richard Nixon) and the 
actual impeachment of another (Bill Clinton).11 
Other examples that we discuss at length are less well known, but 
no less important.  Consider Andrew Jackson’s war on the Bank of 
the United States.  After Jackson vetoed the bill that would have reau-
thorized the Bank, the Bank, under the leadership of Nicholas Bid-
dle, actively campaigned against Jackson and precipitated a financial 
panic to increase the political pressure on Jackson.  To get a sense of 
the magnitude of the controversy, one need only imagine what would 
happen if the Federal Reserve Bank and its Chairman actively cam-
paigned against a particular candidate in an election.  After winning 
the election, Jackson exerted all of the means at his disposal to crush 
the Bank, including the statutory authority to revoke the Bank’s au-
thority to serve as the official repository for federal funds.  After Trea-
sury Secretary William Duane refused to remove the federal deposits, 
Jackson fired him and replaced him with Roger Taney, who acceded 
to Jackson’s wishes.  This touched off the biggest political battle the 
country had ever witnessed up to that point.  Its final resolution is 
widely regarded as a ringing reaffirmation of the unitariness of the 
executive branch.12 
In addition, more or less contemporaneously with his plan to pack 
the Supreme Court, Franklin Delano Roosevelt attempted to reorgan-
ize the executive branch to bring it firmly within presidential control.  
Even FDR’s enormous popularity was not enough to carry the day.13 
We recount these and other stories at length in our book.  These 
historical episodes help us place the recent controversy over the 
scope of executive authority asserted by President George W. Bush in 
its proper perspective.  Most importantly, the episodes we recount 
underscore that the importance of keeping the deliberations over the 
unitary executive from becoming overwhelmed by the politics of the 
moment.  The implications are ultimately more important and en-
during. 
 
 11 Id. at 353–54, 365–66, 376–78, 386, 390, 400–04, 425–27. 
 12 Id. at 105–19. 
 13 Id. at 291–99. 
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II.  LOOKING FORWARD 
If someone had told me that the project would still be incomplete 
after more than a dozen years of work, I would not have believed 
them.  But, as anyone who has written a book can attest, the process 
of learning and refining that underlies any extended program of re-
search is perpetually inchoate.  As part of this process, I am grateful 
to all of the participants in this conference for the willingness to de-
vote their time and intellect to engage our work in such a perceptive 
and meaningful way. 
During the course of this conference, we received a wealth of new 
insights, ideas, comments, and criticisms that we will clearly explore 
in greater depth in our later work.  Rather than using the limited 
space available in this issue to respond to every issue raised during 
the conference, I will limit myself to a few broad observations about 
some of the larger themes that recurred in the commentary. 
A.  The Widespread Acceptance of Departmentalism 
One of the most striking aspects of this conference is the general 
acceptance of departmentalism as the appropriate approach to con-
stitutional interpretation.  Some participants openly embrace three-
branch constitutional interpretation in their submissions,14 while oth-
ers endorse or at least express sympathy with the approach in their 
other published work.15 
I find the growing acceptance of departmentalism as an interpre-
tive methodology to be both reassuring and frustrating.  On the one 
hand, the body of scholarship rejecting judicial supremacy and ac-
knowledging the Congress’s and the president’s authority to interpret 
the Constitution grows larger with every passing year.16  And yet de-
spite the near absence of any scholarly defenses of judicial suprem-
acy,17 most practicing lawyers unquestioningly accept judical suprem-
 
 14 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Construction and Departmentalism:  A Case Study of the 
Demise of the Whig Presidency, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 425, 427–31 (2010); L.A. Powe, Jr., The 
Court’s Constitution, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 529 (2010) (“Departmentalism—the ability 
and right of each branch of the federal government to interpret the Constitution for it-
self—has a long and often honorable history.”). 
 15 See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Essay, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 83 (1998); Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781 
(2003). 
 16 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 436 n.5 (collecting authorities); Calabresi & Yoo, 
supra note 3, at 1463–72 (same). 
 17 For the leading recent defense of judicial supremacy, see Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). 
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acy as the definitive approach to constitutional interpretation.  The 
disconnect between the scholarly consensus and the conventional 
wisdom remains something of a puzzle. 
B.  Removal Versus Direction 
Several commentators have observed that our book offers a 
stronger showing of presidential assertions of the power to remove 
executive officials and a weaker showing of the president’s authority 
to direct executive officials in their actions.18  Some dispute the his-
torical origins of the practice.19  Others dispute whether the power of 
direction has been borne out over time.20 
As we note in our book, the tradition of presidential direction of 
subordinates remains quite strong, exemplified in the executive or-
ders mandating nondiscrimination in hiring and in federal contracts 
and establishing centralized review of all agency rulemaking.21  And 
throughout U.S. history, presidents continued to issue policy direc-
tives to subordinate federal officials, including members of the inde-
pendent regulatory commissions. 
Perhaps the most dramatic recent example is Clinton’s practice of 
issuing directives ordering agencies to initiate specific regulatory ac-
tions and even dictating the outcome, a development that we discuss, 
but to which we probably do not pay sufficient attention.22  The result 
is a form of “presidential administration” in which the President ex-
 
 18 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort and 
Abuse It:  A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 597–99 (2010).  For the leading statement of this position, see Pe-
ter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?  The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 696 (2007). 
 19 Jerry Mashaw recounts the episode during the Embargo in which President Jefferson in-
structed the collectors of the revenue to hold a vessel.  The courts held that nothing in 
the statute gave the president the authority to direct the collectors to hold vessels con-
trary to their judgment.  Jefferson instructed other collectors to ignore mandamus orders 
to that effect.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Center and Periphery in Antebellum Federal Administration:  
The Multiple Faces of Popular Control, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 336–39 (2010) [hereinafter 
Mashaw, Center and Periphery].  Although Mashaw focuses on the judicial interpretation of 
the statute to conclude that Congress has the power to insulate decisions made by subor-
dinate executive officials from presidential interference, focusing on Jefferson’s determi-
nation to ignore such a judicial construction supports the opposite conclusion.  See Jerry 
L. Mashaw, Governmental Practice and Presidential Direction:  Lessons from the Antebellum Repub-
lic?, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659, 677–80 (2009) (entertaining but ultimately rejecting al-
ternative interpretations of this episode). 
 20 See Harold J. Krent, The Sometimes Unitary Executive:  Presidential Practice Throughout History, 
25 CONST. COMMENT. 489, 492 (2009) (reviewing CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1). 
 21 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 420–22. 
 22 Id. at 395.  For a more complete discussion, see Kagan, supra note 5, at 2290–303. 
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erts far more direct influence over regulatory policy than the ex post 
review conducted by the Office of Management and Budget tradi-
tionally associated with the unitary executive.23  The Administration of 
George W. Bush expanded the practice to include “prompt letters” 
requesting that particular regulatory initiatives be undertaken, as has 
the Obama Administration.24 
Making the president’s policy preferences clear before the issue 
has crystallized into concrete regulatory action allows the president to 
influence the course of administration at the time when decisionmak-
ing processes are the most open and malleable.  It also effectively 
avoids the political liabilities of having to remove an official or over-
turn a decision after it has been made.  Thus, if anything, we see the 
tradition of presidential direction of lower executive officials as grow-
ing stronger, not weaker.  And even if this criticism is well taken, 
these arguments concede that our book does establish the strength of 
the tradition in favor of the president’s authority to remove.  In so 
doing, they confirm the essential point of the unitary executive posi-
tion. 
C.  The Lack of Actual Control over Agency Officials 
A number of commentators observe that it is impossible for any 
one person to exercise control over a bureaucracy as large as the fed-
eral government’s.25  In such a world, a unitary executive, in which 
the president exercises meaningful control over all aspects of the 
administration, remains a practical impossibility. 
In my opinion, this argument cuts in the other direction.  The fact 
that presidents cannot exercise de facto authority over all aspects of 
the execution of federal law strengthens rather than weakens the case 
for recognizing that they possess strong de jure authority.  Consider 
the same set of arguments in the context of any large corporation 
characterized by strong, hierarchical control.  Even though the chief 
executive officer cannot oversee all of the myriad tasks undertaken by 
the company in any meaningful way, this fact does not prevent such 
an organization from functioning in a reasonably coherent manner.  
The reason is that any actor in the organization who persistently fails 
 
 23 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 325–29. 
 24 Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 461, 
486–87 (2010) (citing John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Eco-
nomics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 460 (2008)). 
 25 See id. at 482–84, 488; Farina, supra note 7, at 422; Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Me-
nashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 265 (2010); 
Pierce, supra note 18, at 601–02. 
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to carry out his or her duties in an appropriate manner face having 
his or her decisions overridden and eventually dismissed.  The fact 
that this degree of oversight cannot be exercised every time a subor-
dinate makes a mistake does not weaken the importance of ensuring 
that the CEO possesses the authority to intervene whenever neces-
sary.  Indeed, it is the constancy of that threat that makes up for the 
CEO’s inability to police every employee’s conduct. 
D.  The Role of Politics 
Finally, a number of commentators observe that the normative at-
tractiveness of the unitary executive must be evaluated in light of a 
wide range of political considerations that may or may not make 
strong unitary control more likely to lead to good policy outcomes.26  
Jerry Mashaw points out that alternative mechanisms exist by which 
citizens can exercise popular control of administration.27 
As Bill Marshall notes, certain types of structural purists would re-
gard the normative implications as being irrelevant.28  Furthermore, 
ensuring that administrative policy reflects majority preferences is on-
ly one of several normative justifications for unitariness.  Other con-
siderations include energy, accountability, and relative lack of suscep-
tibility to collective action problems, just to name a few.29  Even if one 
is willing to take such considerations into account, the arguments ad-
vanced so far simply demonstrate the possibility that the president may 
be less representative of majority preferences than Congress; they do 
little to establish the whether such an outcome is likely. 
Consider, for example, Professor Nzelibe’s observation that a suc-
cessful president need only capture a bare majority of the voters in 
states constituting a bare majority of the Electoral College.  Thus as a 
theoretical matter, a president could gain election despite having the 
support of little more than twenty-five percent of the nation’s voters 
(fifty percent of the voters in states comprising fifty percent of the 
electorate) and the support of as few as eleven states (the minimum 
 
 26 See Farina, supra note 7, at 374–95; William P. Marshall, The Vision of the Nationalist Presi-
dency or Another Unpersuasive Claim for Expansive Presidential Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
549, 550–66 (2010); Jide Nzelibe, Does the Unitary Presidency Really Need a Nationalist Justifi-
cation?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 623, 625–28 (2010); Tushnet, supra note 2, at 315–18, 322–
25. 
 27 Mashaw, Center and Periphery, supra note 19, at 332–34. 
 28 Marshall, supra note 26, at 556. 
 29 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 103, 116 (2009), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lawreview/articles/2009/11/
Calabresi-Yoo-62-Vand-L-Rev-En-Banc-103.pdf. 
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number of states needed to command a majority of the Electoral Col-
lege).30  The same is true of the House of Representatives, which can 
be controlled by a bare majority of the electors for a bare majority of 
the 435 districts, which again may theoretically amount to no more 
than twenty-five percent of the nation’s voters.  This means that, as 
with the president, the median Representative may also reflect the 
views of no more than twenty-five percent of the nation.  Indeed, to 
the extent that congressional politics are polarized, a large diffuse 
majority may find it particularly hard to attract proportionate repre-
sentation in the House.  The situation is even more problematic in 
the Senate, where representation is not based on population.  Since 
the twenty-five least populous states encompass only sixteen percent 
of the nation’s population,31 the median voter in the Senate could re-
flect the views of as little as eight percent of the population. 
Determining whether Congress or the presidency is more likely to 
be representative of the preferences of the overall electorate depends 
on which outcome is likely to be more robust.  This is not a question 
that can be answered a priori based on theoretical arguments.  Given 
the nature of presidential elections, it is quite plausible that the chief 
executive is more likely than Congress to reflect the views of a diffuse 
national majority. 
It is equally important to analyze which actors would fill the void 
should the administration be screened from presidential control.  As 
we have noted elsewhere, preventing the president from exercising 
control over the bureaucracy simply renders the bureaucracy com-
pletely subject to a single branch of the government:  Congress.  
Thus, contrary to what some have suggested, ensuring the president’s 
continuing role in overseeing the execution of the law helps preserve 
the type of dynamic tension among the branches that James Madison 
envisioned.  Deviating from it would leave the administration to the 
mercy of a single branch.32 
CONCLUSION 
Like any fertile subject of legal and historical analysis, the debate 
over the proper scope of the president’s authority over the execution 
of the law is one that may never be fully resolved.  This conference, 
 
 30 See Nzelibe, supra note 26, at 626; see also Marshall, supra note 26, at 553–55. 
 31 U.S. Census Bur., National and State Population Estimates:  Annual Population Estimates 
2000 to 2009, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited Jan. 
29, 2010). 
 32 See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 29, at 117. 
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which was originally intended to mark the end of our book project, is 
much like the conference that marked its beginning, providing more 
questions than answers and serving as a basis for debating a wide 
range of interesting and controversial issues.  We offer our deepest 
thanks to everyone who participated in the conference and look for-
ward to continuing the debate in the years to come. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
